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Abstract  
In this manuscript, the authors present an overview of the history, an account of the theoretical 
and methodological controversy, and an illustration of contemporary and revised methods for 
the exploration of unconscious processing. Initially we discuss historical approaches relating to 
unconsciousness that are, arguably, defamed and considered extraneous to contemporary 
psychological research. We support that awareness of the history of the current subject is 
pedagogically essential to understand the transition to empirical research and the reasons for 
which the current area is still so contentious among contemporary psychologists. We proceed to 
explore the current experimental canon. Contemporary theoretical and methodological issues 
relating to unconscious processing are discussed in detail and key issues and key advancements 
in contemporary research are presented. Developments that have, in recent years, being 
suggested to contribute to a possibly reliable method for the assessment of unconscious 
processing are practically - methodologically and statistically – illustrated using easy-to-follow 
steps applied in real experimental data. Mindful of our own place in the long history of this topic, 
we conclude the manuscript with suggestions concerning the future of the current area.  
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The History of the Unconscious and its Significance 
Like psychology itself (Ebbinghaus, 1908), the study of the unconscious has a long past, 
but a short history. The unconscious already appears in Plato's Socratic dialogues (Devereux, 
2016). Plato describes how Socrates, after successfully demonstrating to Meno that one of his 
uneducated servants was knowledgeable of the Pythagorean theorem, advocated that we possess 
untaught, unaware and innate knowledge (anamnesis) that could originate from inborn and pre-
corporeal experiences of the human soul (Cornelli, 2019). Similar arguments for a transcendental 
unconscious were made by Carl Gustav Carus (1846) and were part of philosophical-religious 
texts by Friedrich Schelling (1858) and Eduard von Hartmann (1869). The first dedicated 
phenomenological analysis of the unconscious, as a regression to the patterns of thinking of the 
"primitive man", was made by Friedrich Nietzsche (1876). In his book Human, all too Human, 
Nietzsche adopted the style of romantic era writers, such as William Wordsworth, Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge and William Blake, and wondered, with poetical and philosophical eloquence, "how 
comes it that the mind of the dreamer goes so far astray when the same mind, awake, is habitually 
cautious, careful, and so conservative in its dealings with hypotheses? […] In the dream this 
atavistic relic of humanity manifests its existence within us, for it is the foundation upon which 
the higher rational faculty developed itself and still develops itself in every individual. Dreams 
carry us back to the earlier stages of human culture […] we can see how late strict, logical 
thought, the true notion of cause and effect must have been in developing, since our intellectual 
and rational faculties to this very day revert to these primitive processes of deduction […].—
Even the poet, the artist, ascribes to his sentimental and emotional states causes which are not 
the true ones." (Nietzsche, 1876, p. 34).  
Twenty years after Nietzsche’s Human, all too Human, the Studies in Hysteria (Breuer 
& Freud, 1895) were published. In the Studies, the concept of the unconscious was for the first 
time used in an applied psychological context. Sigmund Freud, living in what was one of the 
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most puritanical and religious eras of continental philosophy (Smith, 1994), suggested that the 
human psyche was governed by a phylogenetically shaped topography (Freud, 1910; Figure 1). 
Freud's psychoanalytic theory outlined that we are driven by fierce instinctual and moral 
impulses (Freud, 1933), and that neurosis is due to the repression of incestuous sexual desires to 
the unconscious (Freud, 1942). Freud expounded that the means to reaching this previously 
uncharted territory of the human psyche is psychoanalysis and the psychoanalyst (Freud, 1921).  
Freudian psychoanalysis was applied in 
clinical settings for the better part of the 20th 
century despite ferocious and relentless clinical 
and philosophical (Wallace & Edwin, 1983), and 
intra-psychoanalytic dispute (Jung, 1928; Klein, 
1946). Freud fiercely advocated that 
psychoanalysis was a natural science (Wittels, 
2016) and that unconscious repression was a 
heritable trait that followed Darwinian and neo-
Lamarckian evolutionary patterns (for a review, 
see Smith, 2016). He suggested that the 
unconscious manifested since the very early 
beginnings of human culture (Freud, 1913) as a 
repository for the repression of inappropriate 
sexual impulses (Freud, 1905).  
Freud considered that psychoanalysis 
should progress using a unitary theory of the 
unconscious. He exercised strict exclusion tactics to any and all members of the psychoanalytic 
movement who did not share his observations concerning the unconscious mind (Britzman, 
Figure 1: Psychoanalytic Topography
 
 Fig. 1: A visual representation of the psychoanalytic 
topography. The Psychoanalytic model included the 
Ego, thoughts and perceptions, the Super-Ego, 
moral judgement, and the ID; our instinctual 
impulses; such as Eros and Thanatos, and traumatic 
experiences, as well as irrational, unacceptable and 
violent sexual desires. The psychoanalytic 
topography included another three layers: the 
conscious, the part of the self that is currently 
subject to awareness, the preconscious, the part of 
the self that is not currently subject to awareness but 
is potentially accessible, and the unconscious, that 
is not accessible by awareness. Contrary to common 
belief, both the Super-Ego and the ID could be 
repressed and be part of the unconscious mind, and 
according to this model contribute to neurosis, the 
attempt of the Ego to defend against unwelcome 
internal impulses or traumatic experiences, or 
psychosis; the attempt of the Ego to defend against 
on-going external psychological harm (Freud, 
1921).  
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2016). Despite these tactics, eventually, Carl Jung (1928) and Melanie Klein (1946) divided 
psychoanalysis by proposing that sexuality is not the only driving force of the unconscious mind 
and that the existential struggle for self-understanding, pre-sexual affect and developmental 
attachment also underlie unconscious processes (Brown, 1961).  
While these concepts were debated and developed by psychoanalytic theorists and 
practitioners, empirical science was also developing as a philosophical concept (Broadbent, 
2004). Karl Popper (1962) was one of the major figures that contributed to the formulation of 
the contemporary scientific method and also argued towards an irreparable paradigm “breach” 
between psychoanalysis and psychology (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Morsella & Reyes, 2016). 
Popper proposed that science should postulate a testable hypothesis, that this hypothesis should 
be falsifiable, and that the concept of psychoanalytic repression, being an interpretive axiom, 
had no scientific validity; it could not be disproven and, therefore, it could not provide any 
credible and testable proof to support its theoretical postulations (Laguex, 1993).  
 As a simple illustration of his argument, Popper made reference to Totem and Taboo and 
Civilization and its Discontents, where Freud (1913, 1927, 1930) – in one of, admittedly, his 
most controversial theories – suggested that repression could be traced back to an actual 
occurrence of an Oedipal incident in a prehistoric human society. In this society, tyrannical 
paternal hierarchy resulted in patricide for the re-distribution of ruling privileges and sexual 
access to female members of the social group. Freud argued that the murder of the father in this 
society resulted in extreme and terrorizing guilt that contributed to the formulation of repressive 
mechanisms (Freud, 1913). Popper considered this theory retrospective, lacking in hypothetical 
predictions and therefore, unscientific. Popper emphasized that psychoanalysis applied the 
notion of repression in the phenomena it examined as opposed to explore whether the phenomena 
under investigation provided evidence for repression (Thornton, 1997). He suggested that the 
6  
  
psychoanalytic assessment of the unconscious was infallible and, therefore, hermeneutic (see 
Blight, 1981).  
Popper’s authoritative tone – that several authors have found comparable to Freud’s own 
authoritative tone (Kirsner, 2007) – caused notable reactions amongst psychoanalysts. Members 
of the psychoanalytic movement supported that the refutation that Popper offered was not privy 
to the internal workings of the psychoanalytic method (Ahumada, 1997), that it did not refute 
the validity of the experiential evaluation of the psychic life of the individual (Edelson, 1985) 
and reflected Popper’s own unconscious processes (Levy, 1996). Popper considered that his 
critique was validated by, particularly, the latter argument (Grünbaum, 1977, 1984, 1993). He 
suggested that psychoanalysis used psychoanalysis to defend psychoanalysis and therefore, that 
it is an untestable and infallible pseudoscience (for a comprehensive and thorough review of the 
term, see Hansson, 2008).  
Popper and his contemporaries (Mayo, 1996), although largely disagreeing between them 
concerning the reasons for which one should disagree with the psychoanalytic assessment (for a 
thorough review, see Maxwell, 2005), unanimously suggested that psychology should adopt 
testable criteria for exploring the unconscious mind (Shearmur & Stokes, 2016). Several 
researchers had – prior to the aforementioned debate – proposed neural and cognitive models 
that could relate to unconscious processes (see for example Sidis, 1898; Peirce, 1906; Landis, 
1930; Papez, 1937; MacLean, 1955; Bridgeman, 1971) and several researchers had proposed the 
implementation of testable psychological and sociological experimental methods for exploring 
concepts related to the unconscious mind (Bartlett, 1920, 1932, 1955; Erdelyi, 1974, 1985, 1992; 
Greenwald, 1992; Conway, 2001). These approaches were not the result of the controversy, these 
simply deservedly received more, wider, and perhaps, in certain cases (see Cory & Gardner, 
2002) even belated, acknowledgement as a result (Mancia, 2007).    
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For example, James Papez, as early as 1937, had proposed a neuroanatomical model of 
automatic emotional neurocircuitry. Papez suggested that a circuit of neural structures including 
the fornix, the anterior thalamic nucleus and the hippocampus could be associated with the 
experience of emotion. His observations were based on patients with lesions located at or 
proximate to the hippocampus who displayed involuntary aggression. Paul D. McLean (1949, 
1952, 1955) suggested that patients with amygdala and septal nuclei lesions showed 
dysregulations in the expression of fear and aggression, and that these structures could also play 
an important role in unaware emotional expression. Though both the septal nuclei and the 
hippocampus were eventually shown to be part of the neural pathway, and not per se the key 
processing structures, for emotional responses (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010), the models proposed 
by Papez and McLean formed the foundation for contemporary models relating to unconscious 
emotion (Roxo, 2011).  
Conversely, Bartlett, in his pivotal works (1920, 1932, 1955) on anthropology and 
psychology, suggested that our memories (personally and culturally) could be regulated and re-
shaped by cognitive psychological mechanisms, as opposed to shaping our unconscious impulses 
(see also the seminal work in this area by Collins & Quillian, 1972 and Collins & Loftus, 1975). 
Eventually, Greenwald (1992) and Erdelyi (1992) proposed testable experimental models for 
unconscious processing (see also Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur & Sergent, 2006). They 
suggested that the unconscious could manifest as implicit cognition, meaning that a salient cue 
could be unattended and rendered pre-conscious (presently unaware but potentially accessible 
by conscious awareness), due to, for example, experimental manipulations relating to a 
distracting engagement task (see for example van der Hout et al., 1997). Greenwald and Erdelyi 
also proposed that unconscious processing can manifest as an inability to recollect the 
presentation of a visual or auditory stimulus (see also Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Schacter, 
1986; Schacter & Graf, 1986). This could include the inability to report the occurrence of a 
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stimulus that nevertheless provided empirical evidence for perceptual processing during 
engagement task responses, such as higher response times for the evaluation of conscious stimuli 
when exposed to a confounding unconscious prime and involuntary attentional switches from or 
towards conscious stimuli when these were, respectively, incompatible or compatible with a 
presented unconscious cue (see for example Jacoby, 1991). This distinction between pre-
conscious (unaware but potentially accessible) and unconscious (unaware and inaccessible) 
(Freud, 1942; Dehaene et al., 2006; Kihlstrom, 1990, 1996, 2013) was preserved in 
contemporary psychological research and formed the basis for the contemporary assessment of 
unconscious processes (Lapate et al., 2017; Siegel et al., 2018).  
By the late 20th century, psychology was almost entirely dedicated to cognitive models of 
unconscious processes and to some extent – in this area – became synonymous with these. The 
early theoretical notions of unconsciousness were – for better or for worse – eclipsed from 
psychological textbooks (Thorn & Henley, 1997) and this ostracization had bipolar 
repercussions (Gergen, 2001; Benjamin, 2007, see also McWilliam, Poronnik & Taylor, 2008). 
Several contemporary psychologists “felt” that any association with unconscious research was 
an unwelcome and excommunicated reminder of a taboo era of pre-scientific psychology 
(Pratkanis, 1992). Conversely, several of, particularly, our younger colleagues were simply 
unaware of what had transpired before the current area of research was – arguably and for a 
while – a trend in contemporary psychological settings (Conway, 2001).  
Contemporary Models of Unconscious Processing 
By the turn of the 21th century, Joseph LeDoux was one of the first (Wiens & Öhman, 
2007; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010) modern researchers to propose an acknowledged neural 
processing model for the unconscious mind that had a significant impact in the psychological 
community (LeDoux, 1989; 1992; 1993). LeDoux’s model suggested that a subcortical pathway 
from the visual thalamus to the amygdala regulates the processing of emotional stimuli that 
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require an imminent “fight-or-flight” defence response (Airapetyantz & Bykov, 1945; Bruner & 
Postman, 1949; Plutchik, Kellerman, & Conte, 1979; Öhman, 1986a, 1986b; Power & Brewin, 
1991). This subcortical pathway was suggested to bypass the occipital cortex and render higher 
cortical executive functions, in the pre-frontal cortex, unnecessary. The purpose of this pathway 
was to elicit survival-related responses to emotional elicitors, without relying on relatively slow 
cortical systems for the initiation or inhibition of action and do so by triggering automatic and 
involuntary, peripheral, sympathetic and parasympathetic, nervous system arousal (van der 
Ploeg et al., 2017). LeDoux’s model suggested that we can experience fear without the need for 
conscious awareness because we require a mechanism for immediate responses to survival-
related environmental cues.  
Subsequent conceptual and experimental contributions to the study of unconscious 
emotion were, with notable exceptions (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010), “rapt” by the appeal of the 
LeDoux model. As a result a substantial part of subsequent research did not conceptually or 
methodologically address many important issues that were considered seminal rally points for 
the exploration of emotional processing in other areas of experimental psychology (see 
particularly Lazarus, 1991). These included the consideration of parallel central and peripheral 
nervous system processing (Bard, 1934), and particularly the debate concerning whether 
affective processing has priority over semantic processing (Zajonc, 1980; Lazarus, 1981, 1982; 
Lai, 2012), the importance of context in the interpretation of physiological arousal (Schachter & 
Singer, 1962; Marcel, 1983) and the consideration of the distinction between unconscious 
(unaware and inaccessible) and pre-conscious (currently unaware but potentially conscious) 
emotional processes (Dehaene et al., 2006; Bargh & Morsella, 2008).  
In their majority, but not exclusively (Pessoa et al., 2005a; 2005b), publications in the 
area of unconscious processing expanded the neurocircuitry and the evolutionary utility of the 
original model (Brooks et al., 2012). The locus coeruleus and several parts of the lower brainstem 
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were added to the neurocircuitry of subliminal pathways and were suggested as ‘hubs’ for the 
dissemination of peripheral nervous system arousal in response to unconscious emotional cues 
(Liddell et al., 2005). Numerous studies using backward masking, interocular rivalry and 
continuous flash suppression (see Figure 2), with healthy participants and participants with 
visual scotomas 1  provided empirical support for physiological changes in response to 
unconscious emotion (van der Ploeg et al., 2017). These studies presented masked emotional 
faces, emotional pictures, spiders, snakes and other evolutionary important stimuli (Williams, 
2018), assessed neural (e.g. EEG, fMRI, and PET) and physiological responses (e.g. skin 
conductance2, heart rate, and blood pressure), and suggested that we can experience neural 
activation and physiological arousal in response to subliminal emotional stimuli, meaning 
literally in Latin emotional stimuli that are below the threshold; implied here: of conscious 
awareness (Williams et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 An area of partial impairment in the field of vision consisting of a diminished or entirely degenerated visual acuity surrounded by a field of 
normal – or relatively well-preserved – vision. Patients with this conditions are, debatably, suggested to retain reactivity to overt and 
unconscious signals of fear (Naccache, 2015)   
2 Skin conductance is a method of assessing sympathetic peripheral nervous system arousal via the application of a small electrical charge and 
the measurement of subcutaneous sweating between typically the first (index) and second (middle) finger of a participant’s hand (see van der 
Ploeg et al., 2017).   
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 Figure 2: Contemporary Methods for the Presentation of Unconscious Stimuli  
 A. Backward Masking       B. Binocular Rivalry  
     
  
C. Continuous Flash Suppression  
  Non-Dominant  Dominant  
 
Fig. 2: Visual suppression techniques used in contemporary research. Previous research has proposed that these 
techniques operate via similar suppressive processes associated with the inhibition of the V1 in the primary visual 
cortex (Baker & Graf, 2008; Jeroen et al., 2007). Several previous studies suggested that Continuous Flash 
Suppression (CFS) (Figure 2; C.) utilizes secondary visual cortex areas (see for example, Tsuchiya et al., 2006). 
These relate to the perception of movement and make CFS a more effective method for the suppression of emotional 
stimuli compared to its alternatives (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Breitmeyer (2007; 2018) also proposed that 
Backward Masking (Figure 2; A.) does not include para and meta-contrast effects (signifying in this context post-
trial retinal-thalamic contrast residues relating to the presentation of the mask and masked stimuli in different 
locations of the perceptual vector) as compared to CFS and Binocular Rivalry (BR) (Figure 2; B.). Therefore, 
backward masking could elicit more effective visual suppression relating to detecting whether a potentially 
emotional masked stimulus was presented (but see also Kim et al., 2010). CFS and BR, on the other hand, could 
elicit more efficient suppression concerning what type of emotional stimulus was presented. This is suggested to 
occur due to para and meta-contrast effects. These could result in parallel and increased retinal-thalamic input and 
could induce higher cognitive load to occipital/primary and secondary visual cortex structures, and ventral and 
dorsal pathways associated with stimulus recognition (Breitmeyer, Ogmen & Öğmen, 2006). For a comprehensive 
review on this topic, the authors suggest the excellent work published by Bachmann and Francis (2013).  
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“Subliminal” 
Despite its conceptual appeal, this revised notion of subliminality (Dehaene et al., 2006), 
once more divided psychology and neuroscience (Pessoa, 2005). Erdelyi (2004) suggested that 
a substantial number of publications in the field of psychological research referred to some 
variation of subliminal processing and few of these agreed as to the definition or the validity of 
the concept (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; see particularly Shevrin & Dickman, 1980). Relative 
consensus was achieved in the area using a simple mathematical equation: for any type of 
participant response or informational availability defined as ɛ, and for conscious accessibility to 
the presented information defined as α, subliminal processing occurs when α = 0 and ɛ > α 
(Erdelyi, 2004). Support for and against the validity of subliminal processing was provided by 
subsequent empirical research (for a review, see Brooks et al., 2012) and the empirical diversity 
induced a rather polarizing effect; researchers were either firm supporters (Morris & Dolan, 
2001; Pessiglione et al., 2008; Phillips, 2016) or sceptics (Seitz & Watanabe, 2003; Wiens, 2006; 
Lähteenmäki et al., 2015; Tsikandilakis, Chapman & Peirce, 2018) of the idea that we can be 
influenced by subliminal emotion.  
The Controversy in Contemporary Psychological Research 
Several fMRI studies (for a review, see Brooks et al., 2012) were able to provide evidence 
supporting that we can experience emotion without conscious awareness. This line of research 
suggested that the neural structures associated with the processing of emotion (e.g. the amygdala, 
the locus coeruleus, and the cingulate cortex) can be activated automatically and without 
conscious awareness via a subcortical collico-pulvinar pathway (Liddell et al., 2005). This 
subcortical pathway was suggested to elicit, via the brainstem, involuntary physiological arousal 
in response to subliminal emotional cues to enable us to automatically adapt to our environment. 
Several studies expanded on these neural findings and were able to report increased skin 
conductance and heart rate responses during the presentation of subliminal emotional stimuli 
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(van der Ploeg et al., 2017). The argument raised by this line of research was that emotional cues 
can elicit physiological changes in the complete absence of awareness because they pose a 
demand for imminent, automatic and involuntary “fight-or-flight” and social-adaptive responses 
to unconscious evolutionary important environmental cues that confer survival-related value 
(Meneguzzo, Tsakiris, Schioth & Brooks, 2014).  
An equally substantial number of publications (for a review, see Pessoa, 2017) suggested 
that brief emotional cues can indeed activate key limbic system structures. These structures 
included the amygdala (anger, fear and surprise), the insula (disgust) and the cingulate cortex 
(sadness and pain), enabled fast environmental adaptation to socio-biologically important 
environmental cues and induced physiological arousal. Nevertheless, this line of research 
suggested that physiological arousal in response to masked emotion occurs only in the subset of 
trials in which participants are able to detect or discriminate the presented emotion (Pessoa, 
2005). According to this line of research, the notion of subliminal emotional processing could 
not be supported by previous findings because of several major issues with the assessment of 
subliminality. These issues included the fixed duration of presentation for masked faces 
(Lähteenmäki, Hyönä, Koivisto & Nummenmaa, 2015), the assessment of subliminal perception 
using significance testing (Dienes, 2015), the application of biased measures for the assessment 
of awareness (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999) and the assessment of participant responses without 
trial-by-trial signal detection and discrimination (Pessoa, Japee, Sturman & Ungerleider, 2005; 
Pessoa, Padmala & Morland, 2005), and response confidence analysis (Overgaard, Rote, 
Mouridsen & Ramsøy, 2006).  
Understanding the Controversy  
One important issue that sceptics debated in previous methods, that provided evidence 
for subliminal emotional responses, was that the experimenters presented masked emotion for 
fixed durations of presentation (Lähteenmäki et al., 2015). For example, emotional and neutral 
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faces were presented for durations ranging from 6.25 to 83.33 ms3 with backward masking to 
overt neutral faces and the assumption was made that these masked stimuli will be processed 
below the threshold of conscious awareness indiscriminately of within and between-participants, 
and between-stimulus type differences (Bachmann & Francis, 2013). The issue with this 
approach was that several studies (Pessoa, 2005) reported groups of under- and over-achievers 
in respect to signal detection and discrimination performance, and also differences in detection 
and discrimination performance between different emotional types (Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008). 
For several researchers in the field that meant that differences between participants due to, for 
example, differences in experiential sensitivity (Aru & Bachmann, 2007; Mather & Sutherland, 
2011; Lundqvist, Juth, & Öhman, 2014) and attentional resources (Aru, Bachmann, Singer & 
Melloni, 2012), and differences between facial-emotional characteristics due to, for example, 
differences in emotional recognition reward value (Adolphs, 2002), emotional incongruence 
with the neutral mask (Kim et al., 2010) and higher perceptual acuity in response to pronounced 
facial features, such as valence and arousal (Nummenmaa & Calvo, 2015), attractiveness 
(Tsikandilakis, Bali & Chapman, 2019) and cultural background (Tsikandilakis et al., 2019), 
were sufficient to induce variations in face-detection and emotion-recognition performance, and 
lead to conscious awareness. Therefore, the studies that reported responses to subliminal cues 
were, according to subliminal sceptics, subject to a fundamental misinterpretation, i.e. that 
subliminal perception can be treated as a constant without adjusting for individual differences 
(for a review, see Tsikandilakis, Chapman & Peirce, 2018).  
In addition to this limitation, the method of assessment and the statistical analysis for 
subliminality were subject to criticism. The vast majority of neuroimaging studies (for a review, 
see Brooks et al., 2012) and peripheral nervous system response studies (for a review, see van 
der Ploeg et al., 2017) employed hit rates and frequentist analysis for the assessment of 
                                                 
3 These durations are provided by the authors given the possible intervals allowed by the refresh rate of the monitor as reported in previous 
studies (van der Ploeg et al., 2017). An exact index of how these calculations were made is included in the on-line material (https://osf.io/mp8jx/).  
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subliminality (Dienes, 2015). In this manner, experimenters would calculate the percentage of 
correct answers (hits or true positives) in a post-trial or post-experimental detection or 
discrimination task and compare these using a one sample t-test against chance-level 
performance (e.g. 50%). In case of non-significant results, the researchers would claim evidence 
for subliminal perception. The critical problem with this approach was that hit rates are subject 
to response strategies (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999), such as replying consistently that a stimulus 
was – or was not – presented, due to having a very liberal – or, respectively, a very conservative 
– response criterion for awareness (Overgaard et al., 2006). The limitation of using frequentist 
statistics for the assessment of subliminality is that “non-significantly different to chance” – lack 
of evidence for the alternative hypothesis – is misinterpreted as “significantly” at chance and 
thus as evidence for the null (Dienes, 2015).  
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Table 1: Technical Terms  
Backward 
masking  
A method for suppressing visual stimuli. It consists of the presentation of a masked 
visual cue, such as a face, a picture or a shape presented for a brief duration, typically 
ranging from approximately 5 to 80 ms. The masked cue is followed by a neutral 
stimulus, called a mask, such as a blur, a pattern or a neutral face (> 100 ms). The 
mask is suggested to render the masked cue imperceptible (see also Figure 2). 
Bayesian 
Analysis  
A dynamic and probabilistic inferential method of statistical analysis. It can be 
applied to explore whether the data show evidence for the alternate (or research) 
hypothesis B > 3 (Dienes, 2014; 2015) or B10 ≥ 10 (Jaronsz & Willey, 2014), whether 
the data show evidence for the null hypothesis (B < .33 or B01 ≥ 10), or whether the 
data are insensitive to both hypotheses ( .33 > B < .3 or 1 > B01 or 10 < 10). 
Bayes 
Factor 
Bayesian analysis allows the researcher to compute a likelihood ratio for the 
probability of observing the data under the alternative vs. the null hypothesis. This 
is the so-called Bayes factor B10, where B10 ≥ 10 or B > 3 stand for evidence for the 
alternative relative to the null hypothesis, while conversely B01 ≥ 10 or B < .33 stand 
for evidence for the null relative to the alternate hypothesis (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; 
Dienes, 2014; 2015). The Bayes factor was adjusted using the logic of a one-sample 
t-test to the study of conscious awareness. Given that performance in a signal 
detection or discrimination task was different to chance (.5) by a defined numerical 
variable x, if x - .5 was within a priori defined criteria for chance level performance, 
the analysis indicated a Bayes factor of B01 ≥ 10 or B < .33 or less and evidence for 
the null, in this case subliminal processing.  
Binocular 
Rivalry  
A method for suppressing visual stimuli. It consists of the presentation of a target 
stimulus, such as a face, a picture or a shape to, typically, the non-dominant eye, and 
the parallel presentation of a neutral distractor, such as a blur, a pattern or a neutral 
stimulus, to the dominant eye. The simultaneous presentation of these stimuli is 
suggested to render the target stimulus imperceptible (see also Figure 2).  
Continuous 
Flash 
Suppression  
A method for suppressing visual stimuli. It consists of the presentation of a static 
target stimulus in, typically, the non- dominant eye, such as a face, a picture or a 
shape, and the parallel presentation of a series of distractors to the dominant eye. 
The presentation of a series of multiple distractors is suggested to render the static 
target stimulus imperceptible (see also Figure 2). 
Detection 
(Threshold)  
Frequently referred to as the detection threshold. It indicates whether the participant 
was able to respond whether a visually suppressed stimulus was presented or not.  
Discrimination 
(Threshold)  
Frequently referred to as the discrimination threshold. It indicates whether the 
participant was able to respond what type of visually suppressed stimulus was 
presented. It is sometimes referred to as stimulus or emotional type recognition.  
Meta- 
Awareness  
The ability to report in a post-trial or post-experimental assessment task whether a 
target stimulus was presented. Originally considered synonymous to meta-
cognition. In contemporary research, meta-cognition is considered a separate 
phenomenon relating to experiential awareness, such as subjective awareness of 
having a cognition or subjective ability to regulate a cognition.  
Signal  
Detection 
Theory  
A method for providing a more unbiased assessment for participant response to an 
engagement task. It includes combining in a single metric the correct (hits) and 
incorrect (misses) replies that a participant made.  
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Visual  
Staircase 
Reduction  
A method for suppression of visual stimuli that can be used in addition to backward 
masking, binocular rivalry and continuous flash suppression. It consists of a post-
trial assessment task during which the participant is asked whether they were aware 
of the target stimulus. If the reply is “yes”, the duration, pixelation or saturation of 
the target stimulus is adjusted to render it imperceptible.  
Table 1: Technical terms. The authors suggest that the reader could find thorough and comprehensive reviews in 
relation to masking techniques (Bachmann & Francis, 2013), Bayesian and signal detection terms (Dienes, 2014; 
2015; Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Kellen & Klauer, 2018) and a review of terms relating to distinctions in perceptual 
processing (Dehaene et al., 2006; Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Morsella & Reyes, 2016) in key previous publications. 
For a comprehensive review concerning on-topic terminology in general, see the excellent work provided by 
Axelrod, Bar and Rees (2015).  
 
Responses to the Controversy  
In response to these issues, several publications emerged in this field (for review, see 
Axelrod, Bar & Rees, 2015). These attempted to offer solutions for the assessment of 
subliminality (Brooks et al., 2012; Meneguzzo et al., 2014; van der Ploeg et al., 2017). To address 
the limitation of inferring chance-level performance by failing to reject the null hypothesis, the 
assessment of conscious awareness was addressed using dynamic probabilistic inference. 
Bayesian analysis was employed to assess whether signal detection performance was at chance. 
Bayesian analysis allows the researcher to compute a likelihood ratio for the probability of 
observing the data under the alternative vs. the null hypothesis. This is the so-called Bayes factor 
B10, where 10 stands for alternative relative to null hypothesis. It has been suggested that B10 
needs to be .33 or smaller to provide substantial evidence for the null (Dienes, 2014). Thus, a 
Bayesian analysis can provide evidence for the null, something that is not possible using 
frequentist statistics (Dienes, 2015). To address participant response strategies for awareness, 
signal detection theory measures (d', A’, A”, A; Zhang & Mueller, 2005) were used. These 
provide a more unbiased metric for perception, by taking into account hits (correct 
detections/discriminations) and false alarms (false positives) to control for participant response 
strategies, such as tending to reply yes (liberal bias) or tending to reply no (conservative bias), 
for seeing a masked stimulus (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  
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A Practical Illustration  
  To further illustrate how these methodological developments can change the results of 
an empirical analysis, we present here a practical illustration using an example analysis of 
previously unpublished data. The current data relate to a pilot study undertaken in 2017 by the 
current authors. The population sample consisted of 73 (42 female) undergraduate psychology 
students. The age of participants ranged from 18 to 27 years (M = 21.43, SD = 2.04). The 
participants were presented with fearful, angry, happy, sad and neutral faces, and non-facial blurs 
for 34.72 ms. These were backwards masked with a black and white pattern for 125 ms. Skin 
conductance responses (SCR) were measured after the presentation (maximum deferral; highest 
peak in amplitude one to three seconds post-stimulus offset minus a calculated aggregate of pre-
stimulus baseline scores; see Williams et al., 2005). The participants were then asked to respond 
whether they saw a face (Y/N; for full study design see Tsikandilakis & Chapman, 2018). 
A common analysis for the output provided by the current design would be the calculation 
of overall hit-rates performance (correctly responding that a face was presented) and the 
comparison of overall performance to chance (50%) using a one-sample t-test. In this case, 
overall hit-rate performance was 52.89 % (SD = 14.53%). A one-sample t-test analysis against 
chance reports t (72) = 1.4; p = .165; C.I.: 5.77 to 1.01. A repeated measures ANOVA shows 
that there were significant differences between different emotions (F (3.14, 226.26) = 93.47; p < 
.001; partial eta-squared = .57; Greenhouse-Geisser corrected). Bonferroni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons also show that fearful faces (M = .063, SD = .019) were significantly higher for 
SCR than angry (M = .051, SD = .012; p < .001; d = .76), happy (M = .042, SD = .018; p < .001; 
d = 1.13), sad (M = .024, SD = .011; p < .001; d = 2.51), neutral faces (M = .025, SD = .018; p 
< .001; d = 2.05) and non-facial blurs (M = .024, SD = .015; p < .001; d = 2.27).  
 The analysis suggests evidence for subliminal processing. This could form the basis for 
a publication and yet we have in our current endeavour already made two statistical errors and 
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allowed for a significant omission. As evident from Table 2, the data are subject to a conservative 
response bias for awareness (β = .022). This bias is most pronounced for false positive rates 
(39.42%) and impacts sensitivity (True Positives/ (True Positives + False Negatives)), specificity 
(True Negatives/ (True Negatives + False Positives)) and accuracy ((True Positives + True 
Negatives)/(True Positive + True Negatives + False Positives + False Negatives)); for a full 
review of these terms see Krupinski (2017): 
Table 2: Signal Detection Matrix 
  Face Presented  Face not Presented  
Responded Yes  52.89% 
(True Positives) 
39.42% 
(False Positives) 
Responded No  47.11% 
(False Negatives) 
60.58% 
(True Negatives) 
 
Table 2: Signal detection matrix for the calculation of non-parametric ROC index A. The table shows evidence for 
a conservative response bias (A’ = .58; A’’ = .58; A = .59, SD = .03, SE = .004; β = .022). Manual formulas, code 
and ways to implement analysis for calculating the response bias β can be found in Stanislaw and Todorov (1999; 
p. 139-140; 142-147).  
 
 
In this instance, hit rates are not an appropriate assessment of perception. Receiver 
operating characteristics (ROC), that can provide a metric between hits and misses, are the 
appropriate assessment. The current authors suggest the employment of A (Zhang & Mueller, 
2005). This suggestion is based on advantages that A has compared to d', A’ and A’’. For 
example, compared to d’, A is a nonparametric sensitivity index and does not include any 
specific assumptions about the shape of the underlying distributions (Swats, 2014; but see also 
Hajian-Tilaki et al., 1997)4. A can also provide an index for zero values, such as zero hits or miss 
responses, and provides diagonal Euclidean corrections to the A’ and A’’ metrics for scores that 
lie in the upper left quadrant of the ROC curve. The researchers do not need to write their own 
                                                 
4 Here we must note that mathematical researchers (Grier, 1971) suggest that violations of normality for ROC cannot be tested for multiple signal 
to noise intervals by simply exploring overall detection or discrimination performance. This should be provided by testing the normality of all 
the multiple manipulations of the signal and noise distributions separately (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; p. 140) and testing for evidence for the 
null (Dienes, 2015) for the "proximity of their standard deviations" (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; p. 140-141). An additional proposed method 
is the testing for skewness, kurtosis and linearity between multiple manipulations that vary the signal to noise ratio; meaning in this context 
testing for multivariate normality or goodness-to-fit evaluation of Gaussian linearity for monotonically increasing signal to noise intervals (see 
for example. Coroyer, Jorand, & Duvaut, 1994; Macmillan, Rotello & Miller, 2004). The authors also suggest the excellent work by Robin and 
colleagues (2011) in this area. 
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code for calculating A. This is provided on-line and includes a series of simple steps5. The 
calculation of accuracy for A informs us that for the current data detection performance has a 
mean of .59 (SD = .03).  
  At this point we have successfully incorporated in our data a non-biased assessment for 
participant performance. We still, nevertheless, require an important revision. In our previous 
analysis we used a one-sample t-test and found that hit-rate performance was not significantly 
different to chance; we failed to reject the null. This should not be misinterpreted as evidence for 
the data being “significantly” at chance. In fact, the term significantly at-chance is, debatably, a 
statistical impossibility (see also Dienes, 2014). Our finding simply and literally means that we 
cannot reject the possibility that the null is true. Dienes (2015) provided an easy-to-follow way 
to provide evidence for the null and again the researchers do not need to write code for this 
calculation; the process requires a series of simple steps on-line6. The Dienes method suggests 
that Bayesian analysis can be used to provide a Bayes factor that can indicate at B > 3 evidence 
for the alternate hypothesis, at B < .33 evidence for the null and at .33 > B < 3 insensitivity for 
either hypothesis, meaning that based on the current data we cannot provide a conclusive 
assessment.  
The calculation of the B factor relies on the mean difference of the observed effect and 
the compared value, in this case .59 - .5 = .09. It requires the estimation of the standard error, in 
this case SE = (SD/ square root (n = 73)) = .004. It also requires the definition of intervals for 
testing whether the mean difference provides evidence for being within an a priori defined range. 
The definition of these intervals can be based on previous findings or defined by the researcher 
(Dienes, 2016). For the purpose of the current example, we can set our criteria at reasonable 
intervals around chance (A = .5) at -.1 (lower bound = .4) and .1 (higher bound = .6). If the 
current data are at-least three times more likely to be within (as opposed to outside) standard 
                                                 
5 https://sites.google.com/a/mtu.edu/whynotaprime/   
6 http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm 
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error adjustments of these a priori intervals, the analysis will provide evidence for the null. In 
this case using the Dienes method a uniform model with a mean difference of .09, SE = .004 and 
a priori defined intervals at .4 and .6 reveals a Bayes factor of B > 3. The figure below graphically 
depicts the current result:  
Figure 3: Graphical Illustration of Bayesian Analysis 
 
Fig. 3: Graphical illustration of the Bayesian analysis. The figure includes the lower (A = .4) and higher (A = .6) 
bounds that were used to calculate the intervals that would suggest evidence for chance-level performance (A = .5) 
given the standard error of the mean (.004) in the current data (.49 ≤ Observed Value ≤ .51)7. 
 
The analysis no longer suggests evidence for subliminal processing. In fact, at this stage 
even if we run a one sample t-test against chance (A = .5), the results would, using ROC criteria 
for awareness, report significant differences to chance level performance (t (72) = 28.19; p < 
.001; C.I.: 7.46 to 8.59). The analysis of variance for SCR scores can now only stand as proof 
that brief backwards masked emotional faces elicit changes in physiology, but that this effect is 
not due to subliminal processing. Note here that even if overall performance was at-chance, the 
analysis would have to be repeated for each emotional type (Hand & Till, 2001) to ensure that 
the overall effect is not an aggregate of perceptual diversity as a function of emotion, such as 
lower detection performance for neutral faces and higher detection performance for fearful faces 
(see for example, Kim et al., 2010). 
The “Error of our Ways”  
  The current example should illustrate how unbiased assessment of binary detection (or 
discrimination) responses, direct evidence for the null – in this case chance-level detection (or 
                                                 
7 For an adaptation of standard models of ROC, that treat chance-level performance (A = .5) as a minimum-baseline value, to an accuracy index 
with possible below chance-level values see on-line material (https://osf.io/mp8jx/).    
.492    to    .508 
Area indicating 
evidence for the 
null 
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discrimination) performance – and further per stimulus type assessment (using these methods) 
could change the results of an analysis. These are the possible practical “errors of our ways”, or 
more precisely in this instance an illustration on how to control for these. After the application 
of the aforementioned methods in the above dataset, we controlled for methodologically 
important issues in the assessment of subconscious experience and these steps have disallowed 
us to treat the current data as indicating subliminal processing. 
  In addition to these, at this stage in the manuscript, the authors will have to add 
(theoretical) insult to (statistical) injury and suggest that we assessed the experience of awareness 
using measures of perceptual accuracy. The argument could be made here that subjective 
assessment of non-dichotomous and gradual measures of awareness should be included in our 
engagement tasks. This is a fine argument and it has been made – quite convincingly so – before 
(Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004; Overgaard et al., 2006; Overgaard, Timmermans, Sandberg & 
Cleeremans, 2010; Overgaard & Mogensen, 2017; Tsikandilakis, Peirce & Chapman, 2018). We 
would also like, at this stage, to make a case for the analysis of “error”. If we revisit the original 
argument in relation to subliminality, we will recall that for α being perception of a stimulus and 
ε the response to a stimulus, subliminality occurs when α = 0 and ε > α. Let us now add an 
additional variable to this equation. Let us assume that for α being stimulus perception, Α is the 
perception of the bodily response elicited by the stimulus (e.g. changes in heart rate). 
Subliminality stands now as α = 0, ε > α and A = α.  
Subliminality requires that an invisible emotional stimulus will induce an imperceptible 
response and will be significantly different from the response to an invisible non-emotional (or 
less emotionally salient) stimulus in an explicit or implicit empirical assessment. The 
evolutionary disadvantage of experiencing an emotional response that will not automatically and 
involuntarily elicit the involvement of meta-awareness and meta-cognition, and alarm both 
limbic and higher executive structures to the potentiality of endangering or sociobiologically 
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relevant environmental cues, possibly contradicts the original conception of the notion of 
subliminal processing. Note that here we are not questioning the – indeed unlikely – possibility 
of reporting significantly different responses between stimuli that have provided evidence for 
null perception; we are, in fact, questioning the extent to which emotionally responding to a 
stimulus can evade self-monitoring and awareness. To this end, we cannot use arousal in 
response to invisible emotional stimuli to support our argument – without at least falling in a 
circular debate concerning whether these were indeed subliminal – but we can use responses to 
innocuous stimuli to assess how misperception can be influenced by noise-arousal to lead to the 
experience of awareness (see also MacMillan, 2002; p. 43-45).  
Let us return to our previous data to test, to the extent that our design allows, this 
possibility. In our previous signal detection table we calculated the instances of false positive 
responses. False positive responses indicated that a non-facial stimulus (blur) was presented but 
the participants responded that a facial stimulus was presented. These responses were at 39.42%. 
We also calculated the instances of false negative responses. False negative responses indicated 
that a face was presented but the participants responded that they did not see a facial stimulus. 
These responses were at 47.11%. If we run a simple paired samples t-test for SCR scores between 
these two response types, we find that overall false positive responses were higher for SCR (M 
= .025, SD = .013; D (73) = .982; p = .38) than false negative responses (M = .021, SD = .008; t 
(72) = 2.22, p = .029; d = .39; D (73) = .983; p = .41).  
Participants experienced higher arousal when they thought that they saw a face that was 
not presented compared to when they responded that they did not see a face that was. This finding 
is intriguing, but it is not novel. It is simply understated. Similar findings have been reported 
multiple times by several research groups (Pessoa, Japee, Sturman & Ungerleider, 2005; Pessoa, 
Padmala & Morland, 2005) and also previously by the current authors (Tsikandilakis, Chapman 
& Peirce, 2018; Tsikandilakis, Bali, Derrfuss & Chapman, 2019a, 2019b). For example, in a 
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previous publication (Tsikandilakis, Chapman & Peirce, 2018) we reported a trend for higher 
SCR (p = .084; d = .51) and heart-rate arousal (p = .063; d = .44) for false positive responses, 
responding having seen a face when a face was not presented, compared to true negative 
responses, responding not having seen a face when a face was not presented. In a more recent 
publication (Tsikandilakis, Bali, Derrfuss & Chapman, 2019a) we were able to extend these 
findings and show that false positive responses for having seen a fearful face were significantly 
higher for SCR and heart-rate (p < .001; d SCR = 1.43, d HR = 1.53) compared to true negative 
responses for not having seen a fearful face when participants were presented in both cases with 
stimulus types that were not associated with physiological arousal, such as sad, neutral and non-
facial-blur stimuli. In this instance the argument we can make is quite interesting: physiological 
arousal was associated with awareness; and vice-versa (see also Lapate et al., 2014 and Siegel et 
al., 2017).  
“The Road less Travelled” 
This analytical summary suggests that perception is not equivalent to awareness. 
Awareness – or more accurately meta-awareness in the aforementioned designs (see Table 1) – 
could be an interactive process that influences and is influenced by emotion (Lau, 2007, 2008; 
Aru et al., 2012; Lapate et al., 2014; Siegel et al., 2018). In our case, this is the possible 
theoretical “error of our ways”: the experience of awareness is not limited to (stimulus) 
perception. Perception, of a stimulus and the self, and emotional physiology impact the 
experience of awareness and unawareness, and, paradoxically, “error” – such as responses that 
are incorrect – provide a plethora of physiological evidence to allow us to explore how 
consciousness and unconsciousness function without limiting ourselves to assessing stimuli 
invisibility (Pessoa, 2005).  
It might come as no surprise that both the current research group (Tsikandilakis & 
Chapman, 2018; Tsikandilakis, Chapman & Peirce, 2018; Tsikandilakis, Bali, Derrfuss & 
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Chapman, 2019a; 2019b) and other research groups (see for example Amihai, Deouell & Bentin, 
2011; Lähteenmäki et al., 2015; Pessoa, 2017; 2018) have repeatedly reported that unbiased and 
rigorously controlled implementation of null perception results in null responses irrespective of 
the presented stimulus type. Naturally, this should not be considered as a refutation for the 
concept of gradual awareness and unawareness; it is not. The latter is a concept is very 
interesting, intricate and promising one (Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; Sandberg, Timmermans, 
Overgaard, & Cleeremans. 2010; Kouider, De Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010; Schwitzgebel, 
2011), that has engaged the attention of past research (Tsikandilakis, Peirce & Chapman, 2018; 
Rothkirch, Overgaard & Hesselmann, 2018), and will – most certainly – continue to engage the 
attention of research in this area (Cleeremans, 2019).  
What we have not sufficiently acknowledged – at-least yet – is that misperception – or 
perceptual “error” if you prefer – has offered us “a road not taken” to understanding awareness. 
To put our argument more provocatively, we stand to gain insight concerning the workings of 
consciousness and unconsciousness from instances in which participants “err” between 
presentation and awareness, such as trials in which participants reported consciousness of 
emotions that were not part of the visual suppression, posing the most interesting and, in fact, 
classical (James, 1894; Lange. 1885) of research questions: is the experience of awareness and 
the experience of emotional physiology a palindrome? This line of research could provide 
valuable insights relating to consciousness and unconsciousness.  
Conclusions 
In the current paper, we presented a brief history of conceptualizations relating to the 
unconscious mind. We acknowledged that the current area was contentious and that it still is. 
Several contemporary issues and developments relating to the assessment of subliminality were 
presented, discussed and practically illustrated. We presented the possible practical and 
theoretical “error of our ways” raising some fundamental methodological and statistical issues. 
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We suggested that the practical issue in relevant research is that biased measures of perception 
(hit rates) and insufficient statistical procedures (one-sample t-test) are used to provide evidence 
for subliminality. We illustrated how signal detection theory and evidence for null perception 
can change the outcome of an analysis. We also suggested that the theoretical issue in relevant 
research is that the experience of awareness and unawareness is not limited to (stimulus) 
perception. Along these lines, the opinion of the current authors is that at this stage in research 
relating to unconscious emotion we are studying (also) the subjective experience of awareness 
and unawareness, and not simply the physics of perceptual processes. In this manner we could 
benefit from the interpretation and the analysis of “the error of our ways” empirically and – to 
return to the introduction of the current manuscript, more so, should we be willing to truly learn 
and understand concepts outside our academic comfort zone – metaphorically. We suggest that 
“error” is an opportunity for knowledge. 
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